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Muslims as “Hui” in Late Imperial and Republican 
China. A Historical Reconsideration of Social 
Differentiation and Identity Construction 
Yee Lak Elliot Lee ∗ 
Abstract: »Muslime als Hui im spät-imperialen und republikanischen China«. 
As a minority in China, Muslims have had to deal with a twofold problem: 
maintaining the boundary of their group and integrating into larger society. 
The various responses to this problem in different contexts and under different 
circumstances are evident in various group identity configurations. Based on 
Stausberg, it is proposed that the ways the identities are constructed refer to 
the dynamics of various types of social differentiation. The author argues that 
there were divergent identity configurations among Muslim elites regarding 
their identity sign Huihui in late imperial and post-imperial China, with the 
former constructed in the direction of religiosity and the latter in the direction 
of secularity. In the concluding remark, the author suggests a theoretical ac-
count of his empirical observation by drawing on elements of Luhmann’s theo-
ry of social differentiation. 
Keywords: Hui identity, Islam, late imperial and Republican China, nation state, 
religionization, ethnization, social differentiation, multiple secularities. 
1. Introduction 
In this paper, I present a case of Muslim identity that lies beyond the conven-
tional spatiality of the ‘Islamic civilization,’ and address the dynamics and 
paths that finally resulted in a form of ‘Muslim secularity.’ My focus is on the 
identification of Chinese Muslims, evident in the interpretation of their indige-
nous name Huihui 回回, or Hui 回 in the abbreviated form, and how this corre-
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sponds to different types of social differentiation in various Chinese contexts. I 
will begin with a reinterpretation of the general early naturalization history of 
Muslims in China, considering processes of social differentiation in various 
local societies across imperial China. This will demonstrate the emergence of 
social problems – “reference problems” in Niklas Luhmann’s terms (2012, 
199-214) – that motivated the specific responses seen in the various examples 
of identity construction. This will be followed by a more in-depth historical 
textual analysis of the construction of a Chinese Muslim group identity in sev-
eral late imperial texts that deal with the group identity sign1 produced by an 
intellectual lineage of Han kitab scholars2 in the Jinling 金陵 area, i.e., present-
day Nanjing. This body of texts was selected because the authors’ works are 
well-acknowledged by Chinese Muslims in general, even up until the present, 
and some of their ways of demarcating a Hui(hui) identity were assumed (with 
various alterations) by Chinese Muslim intellectuals in post-imperial China. 
For the final part of the historical analysis in this paper, I will trace the contin-
gent discursive development of the ethnization of the Hui identity in printed 
materials, such as newspapers, magazines, and official documents, in post-
imperial China. 
By focusing on the discourses produced by elite Chinese Muslims regarding 
the meaning of their identity sign, Hui, over the two distinct historical periods 
of late imperial and Republican China, I will demonstrate that their identities 
(at least at the discursive level) are subsumed in forms of social differentiation, 
politics, and the discursive practices of their localized Chinese contexts. Re-
gardless of the contexts, it can be presumed that, as a minority, Muslims have 
to navigate the tension between two “reference problems”3: maintaining the 
religio-cultural group boundary and integrating into wider Chinese society, be 
it local, regional, imperial, or national. The various responses to these two 
problems are constitutive of the configuration of and discourses regarding 
Chinese Muslims’ identities. According to the functional method espoused by 
Luhmann (1970), reference problems do not imply a causal relation with any 
particular performance or solution. Instead, they are taken as the reference 
point for comparing different possible solutions to certain problems (see Bed-
narz 1984, 348-51). Parallel to this line of thought, the multiple secularities 
                                                             
1  Here, “sign” refers to de Saussure’s usage (2013), with the “sound-image” of hui 回 as the 
“signifier” and the people – Chinese Muslims – as the “signified.” 
2  Han kitab (han 漢 ناھ means Chinese and kitab باتك is an Arabic word for book) were a 
body of texts produced by Muslim literati of late imperial China who used the Chinese (Con-
fucian) language to translate Islamic literatures written in the Islamic lingua francas and/or 
to compose directly on Islamic topics. Please refer to the discussion in later parts of this ar-
ticle.  
3  For their discussion of reference problems of secularity, see Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt 
(2012; 2017). 
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approach suggests different types of secularity as possible responses to certain 
reference problems (for more on secularity in the multiple secularities frame-
work, see Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt 2012; 2017; Dressler, Wohlrab-Sahr, 
and Salvatore 2019). As such, whether the response/solution can be identified 
as secularity depends on the existence of discernible language that spells out 
the religious/non-religious distinction and differentiation. Following this logic, 
my main argument is that there were divergent Muslim identity configurations 
(as forms of response) among Muslim elites of late imperial and post-imperial 
China, even though the major reference problems were similar. The empirical 
data shows that the late imperial Muslim identity configuration was constructed 
in the direction of religiosity, whereas the post-imperial one developed towards 
secularity. 
To better illustrate this point, I will borrow Michael Stausberg’s (2010) 
three processes of social differentiation – attributive, structural, and functional 
– to identify possible means of identification in relation to elements of religious 
traditions that develop alongside each type of social differentiation. For the 
section that focuses on the identities of the Hui in late imperial China, particu-
larly on the identity discourses produced by Han kitab scholars, I will demon-
strate that Hui identities were constructed in structural and attributive terms. 
These terms were under the constant influence of the structural arrangement 
and attributive values of various Chinese contexts. The section on post-imperial 
China will illustrate how functional differentiation, especially the reification or 
“religionization” (Dressler 2013) of Islam, came into play with the ethniciza-
tion of the Hui following the Chinese nation-building process from the late 
Qing into the first half of the 20th century. The importation of notions like 
religion, nation, ethnicity, and culture, and their corresponding discourses 
during this period, were decisive in how the Hui elites navigated their identity. 
Although these new notions permitted novelties in the Hui identity (the eventu-
al construction of ethnicity in relation to a reified Islam), they did not neces-
sarily guarantee an identity that was neatly aligned with a functional differenti-
ation where religion and its other were clearly demarked. Instead, the empirical 
data on the creation of the ethnic identity Huihui minzu 回回民族 demonstrates 
the interaction, or even interpenetration, of different types of differentiation 
within group identity development. Thus, in the concluding discussion, I will 
suggest that Stausberg’s framework has to be supplemented by the concepts of 
segmentary and center-peripheral stratification/differentiations. 
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2. Religious Differentiation and Identity 
2.1 Differentiation 
Prior to the adoption of the Western concept of religion through its modern 
Chinese cognate – zongjiao 宗教 – in the 19th century, the modern Western 
idea of a universal or generic category of “religion” to “designate human rela-
tions with the supernatural realm” in contrast to a secular life did not exist in 
China (Yang 2008, 11). The traditional way to designate a religious tradition is 
to use the word jiao 教 (teaching) as the suffix in the name of that tradition 
(ibid., 11). An apt illustration is that one of Islam’s traditional names was Hui-
jiao 回教 (“teaching of the Hui”); this term is still used today in colloquial 
Chinese, especially in Chinese polities such as Taiwan and Hong Kong. How-
ever, even this relatively reified conceptualization with the use of jiao was 
neither universal nor standardized prior to the 19th century. Without such con-
cepts, it is necessary to establish a different means of identifying the subjects 
within this social historical analysis: Islam and Muslims.  
As such, before providing a historical overview of Chinese Muslims’ identi-
fication with the sign Hui and the types of social differentiation implied in the 
negotiations regarding this sign, it is necessary to address some theoretical and 
conceptual issues. I will refer to Michael Stausberg’s three different processes 
of differentiation in order to address nuances in the differentiation of religion 
when dealing with historical material without a discourse or terminology syn-
onymous with those of modern Western secularity. Stausberg terms the first 
type “attributive differentiation,” which “refers to the communicative process 
whereby people communicatively select affairs as special” (Stausberg 2010, 
361). Building on Ann Taves (2009), Stausberg refers to the “special” in terms 
of specific agency and agents, which are conventionally perceived as divine, 
superhuman, or counterintuitive. In other words, these special things are differ-
entiated and thus can be identified (by modern observers) as ‘religious.’ The 
second process is “structural differentiation” (Stausberg 2010, 361-3). This 
occurs when “different/special/specific” actions, events, people, and places 
obtain a formal status such that observers identify them as religion(s) in the 
institutional sense (ibid., 361). According to Stausberg, this happens in a strati-
fied society where religious specialists and religious practices are supported by 
surplus produce. This institutional innovation is accompanied by the develop-
ment of new religious content which identifies the existence of a higher onto-
logical reality, to which a lower sphere is subordinated axiomatically. This 
ideological mutation can be seen in the notion of axial civilizations (see Ár-
nason, Eisenstadt, and Wittrock 2005). The higher ontological reality is usually 
associated with a religious institution. The third stage that Stausberg identifies 
is “functional differentiation” (2010, 363). It is regarded as a very recent devel-
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opment in human history and constitutive for modernities, in which religion is 
converted into one of the relatively autonomous societal function systems 
alongside economy, education, family, law, politics, aesthetics, and science. 
Stausberg outlines these three layers of differentiation within a macro-
social-evolutionary framework. This framework loosely ascribes an increasing-
ly diversified process of differentiation to macro-historical events (on the scale 
of “Big History”), which leaves much space for further investigation. However, 
this framework seems to underplay transsocietal influences and dynamics in 
these differentiation processes, especially prior to the modern wave of globali-
zation. By referencing Shmuel N. Eisenstadt (2005), the proponent of the “mul-
tiple modernities” framework (Eisenstadt 2000), Stausberg’s framework sug-
gests that one should equate societal processes with, and confine them to, 
civilizational boundaries.4 However, one should be aware that multiple socie-
ties can exist within the physical space that is conventionally attributed to a 
particular civilization. Even within its sphere of influence, a civilization may 
have varying degrees of effect on local societies depending on their distance 
from, and exchange with, the civilization’s center of power. Moreover, it is also 
possible for a society to be influenced by different civilizations. With this di-
versity of societal-civilizational arrangements (and their respective dynamics), 
I suggest that different types of differentiation with their associated so-
cial/civilizational origins may co-exist and interact. This realization is im-
portant for the study of social subjects that emerged from the juxtaposition of 
different societal-civilizational elements. The subjects of this article – Chinese 
Muslims – are such social subjects. 
2.2 Differentiated Identity 
The aforementioned three types of differentiation imply different ways of iden-
tifying, and identifying with, ‘religion’ and, hence, foster different types of 
(‘religious’) identity. The first type of identity correlates with attributive differ-
entiation (attributive identity). Attributive differentiation allows people in a 
society to determine something as special, be it sacred, divine, or something 
similar, which is marked as ‘apart’ by specific agents. A person or a collective 
of people may thus identify with and group around that special thing. From the 
modern observers’ point of view, this individual or group, therefore, is ‘reli-
gious’ and demarcated from other human beings because of this.  
The second type of identity corresponds to the second layer of differentia-
tion – structural differentiation. In this regard, structural identity is intertwined 
with religious institutions. One obtains such an identity through institutional 
involvement, which can be recognized as a form of membership, as institutions 
                                                             
4  Here the term 'societal' refers primarily to the institutional aspect of society, whereas 
'civilizational' refers to the symbolic/ideological aspect of society. 
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are “rules that constitute community, shaping how individuals see themselves 
in relation to others, and providing a foundation for purposive action” (Ashiwa 
and Wank 2009, 8). This institutional involvement can also be understood in 
terms of involvement in a religious tradition, where a  
tradition consists essentially of discourses that seek to instruct practitioners 
regarding the correct form and purpose of a given practice. Precisely because 
it is established, it has a history. (Asad 2009, 20)  
This discursive understanding of tradition allows structural religious identity to 
be an outgrowth of attributive religious identity, with the former drawing on 
elements from the latter. However, the two do not simply establish a linear 
historical progression. Rather, structural identity, with its institutional bounda-
ries, enables and/or confines particular formulations or elements to be (discur-
sively) derived from the attributive identity, which further limits the ways of 
formulating new attributive identities.  
The third layer – functional differentiation – complicates its respective iden-
tity construct. This relates to a condition for the emergence of the secular, i.e., 
the process of “disembedding” as understood by Charles Taylor (2016). Dis-
embedding describes the process “wherein people acquire an identity that is 
independent of any particular social order or community” (ibid., 17), and 
wherein they are free to define themselves as individuals beyond referencing 
traditional social institutions. However, I would emphasize that the acquisition 
of individual identity is relative to the constraints of newly emerged and exist-
ing social institutions. As such, an individual identity with relative independ-
ence from the old institution is formulated. Since religion is largely reconfig-
ured as a social sphere of its own and understood alongside other (secular) 
spheres in a horizontal relation, it can no longer shape the social subjects’ iden-
tity as it could in an enchanted worldview (discourse). Instead, it is the individ-
ual who, as an agent (in theory), engages voluntarily in the functionally differ-
entiated religious sphere with a resulting functional (’religious’) identity. 
However, this conceptualization relies heavily on the society-individual duali-
ty, which is overly simplistic in explaining situations beyond the ideal nation 
state constituted by equal individuals. As the historical data on Chinese Mus-
lims’ identity configuration at the turn of the 20th century will demonstrate, the 
effect of functional differentiation can also cover the formation of a meso-level 
group identity, but in a more sophisticated manner. 
3. Identifying Muslims in China as Huihui 
3.1 From Early Settlement to Mongol Rule 
Muslims were in contact with and present in China as early as the late 7th 
century (Lipman 1998, 25). They arrived in China mainly as merchants, emis-
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saries, and tributaries. During this early period, the mode of existence for Mus-
lims in China was largely one of segregation. Living within extraterritorialities 
called fanfang 蕃坊 or “foreign districts,” which were set up and sanctioned by 
the Chinese imperial courts, Muslims largely maintained their own social ar-
rangements following the implementation of shariʻa.5 The confinement of 
Muslims’ lives to these foreign quarters in the commercial cities of China and 
the temporary nature of their stay limited Muslims’ process of naturalization 
and assimilation into the larger Chinese societies. It is likely that there were 
Muslims among the “native-born foreigners” (tusheng fanke 土生藩客) and 
“fifth-generation foreigners” (wushi fanke 五世藩客) in China in the 12th 
century (ibid., 28). Muslims were allowed to purchase land for mosques and 
graveyards; some stayed long enough to be appointed as officials for trade 
affairs and married local Chinese women. However, all these developments 
were still related to commercial arrangements as Muslims – and other foreign-
ers – were primarily engaged in commerce in the period covering Tang (618-
907)6 and Song (960-1276) dynasties. During this period, Chinese sources, at 
most, recognized Muslims on structural terms. There were no specific terms for 
Muslims in the sense of a unique group of religious adherents. Instead, Mus-
lims were identified under either general categories for foreigners (or for “bar-
barians” in the more negative sense) – fan 藩 or hu 胡 – or more specifically 
with the place of origin of these foreigners, mostly Arabia (Ch.: Dashi 大食; 
Persian: Tazi يزات) or Persia (Ch.: Bosi 波斯). Of course, there were undoubt-
edly Nestorian Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians, and probably Buddhists among 
the people designated by these categories. Modern and contemporary scholars 
often have to identify the Muslims among these diverse foreigners through 
careful study of the contextual information given in the Chinese sources. There 
is only one reasonably accurate Chinese-language account of Islam from the 
Tang-Song period. This was written by Du Huan 杜環, a literatus captured at 
the great Battle of Talas in 751. In Jing xing ji 經行記, Du Huan reported on 
the lives of his Arab captors in Central and West Asia which consisted of prac-
tices easily identifiable as the different Pillars of Islam by any modern student 
of religion. Du called these practices Dashi fa 大食法 or the “law of Arabia” 
(Du 2016).7 With works like this, it can be assumed that certain institutional or 
structural features specific to the lives of Muslims were identifiable to subse-
quent Chinese literati during this period. However, this did not increase Chi-
                                                             
5  Attested to in the mid-9th century in Muslim traveler Sulaimana al-Tajir’s account Akhbar 
al-Sin wa-l-Hind (Accounts of China and India) (Ahmad 1989, 37–38; see also Frankel 2017, 
123 and Erie 2016, 47-8). 
6  All durations of dynasties and biographical/reigning years of historical persons are stated in 
the Common Era. 
7  An alternative translation of fa is method (of how one leads one’s life). The original text of 
Jing xing ji has been lost; the surviving portion is in Du Huan’s uncle Du You 杜佑’s Tong 
dian 通典. 
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nese interest in learning more about their foreign neighbors. The identity of 
these diverse groups of Muslims in various commercial cities was shaped by 
their association with the local mosque, while these foreign groups and their 
ways of life remained alien to most Chinese. The fact that the Chinese elites 
kept employing general or even stigmatizing categories to refer to Muslims, 
and that Islam did not attract positive attention from the Chinese elites, sug-
gests that Muslims could hardly separate themselves from their ascribed identi-
ty as (foreign) merchants, considered a degraded class in Confucian social 
theory (Lipman 1998, 30-1). However, due to the lack of materials produced by 
Muslims themselves, it is hard to discuss their identity in terms of their collec-
tive and individual consciousness, or “subjectivity” as Asad terms it (1993, 16). 
It was in the series of events leading to the decline and the eventual fall of 
the Song dynasty and the establishment of the Mongol Yuan dynasty (1279-
1368) that Muslim identity started to diversify from the general category of 
foreign traders. In its campaigns against the Liao dynasty (907-1125) from the 
northern steppe, the Song court had reportedly hired Muslim mercenaries. 
According to Chinese Muslim legends in different family genealogical writings 
(Israeli 2002, 283-4; Li Qingsheng 2004; Li Xinghua 2004; Ma 2007), Emper-
or Shenzong (r. 1067-1085) invited a group of 5,300 Muslim mercenaries, 
under the command of Sharif ‘mir Sayid, or Suofeier 所非爾, to China from 
Bukhara in modern-day Uzbekistan and later added 10,000 more Muslims. As 
the tale continues, Suofeier was said to have earned a reputation as the founder 
and father of Muslims in China, as he discovered that the Tang-Song Chinese 
had misnamed Arabia and Islam as Dashi guo 大食國8 and Dashi fa respec-
tively. He renamed them Huihui guo 回回國 and Huihui jiao 回回教 corre-
spondingly. It is highly unlikely that the name change can be attributed to a 
single person called Suofeier, rather the narrative was constructed retrospec-
tively at a later date (presumably Ming or afterwards), when the term Huihui 
was already in widespread use. Nonetheless, this tale highlights three elements 
of the trajectory of the self-identification of Muslims in China as Huihui. This 
development is linked to 1) the immigration of Muslims from Central Asia 
(Suofeier’s place of origin), 2) the adoption of the Chinese language (only with 
a certain level of mastery of the Chinese language can one decide the ‘correct-
ness’ of one’s Chinese name), and 3) at least some Muslims in China becoming 
conscious of the way they were depicted in relation to Islam (the intention 
behind Suofeier correcting the Chinese words for Islam and their place of 
origin). This emerging group consciousness hints at the problem of group 
boundary maintenance. The historical process of renaming Muslims and Islam 
with the notion Huihui took much longer, from the fall of the Song dynasty, 
through the Yuan and the accelerated sinicization in the Ming dynasty (1368-
                                                             
8  That is, the country of Dashi. 
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1644), with the state’s problem of managing/integrating the ‘naturalization’ of 
new populations. 
For those from northern China around the end of Southern Song dynasty 
(1127-1279), the use of hui to designate a community has its roots in the Chi-
nese ethnonym for the Turkic people of the Kara-Khanid Khanate (840-1212), 
Huihu 回鶻 or Huihe 回紇9; it was then transmuted into Huihui 回回 (Allès 
2000, 29) by the common practice of reduplicating words in the Chinese lan-
guage. In this period, not all Turkic people had converted to Islam. As such, the 
Islamic connotation of Hui(hui) was not fully established. Following the Mon-
gol conquest of China in the late 13th century, the Mongols transferred a huge 
number of Central and Western Asians to China to serve in the Yuan imperial 
administration and military offices. The majority of these immigrants were 
Muslim. Since these immigrants were referred to as Huihui in imperial Chinese 
documents of the Mongol courts, Huihui started to be conflated with the con-
cept of Muslim. This usage stood alongside Huihui being used as a translation 
of the Mongolian term Sart, which referred to a group of people in Central Asia 
(Yao 2004).10 Still, the usage was very diverse and ambiguous. In the late 13th 
to mid-14th centuries, the term Huihui was applied to a range of people includ-
ing Nestorian Christians, Muslims, and Jews of varying Central and West 
Asian origins. There were a few examples of Chinese literature from around 
the late 14th century that made deliberate efforts to separate Huihui from Wei-
wuer 畏兀兒/畏吾兒 (an obvious transliteration of “Uyghur”) and some other 
central Asians (Bai, Ma, and Li ed. 2003, 103-4). However, these attempts did 
not gain wide acceptance and did not endure. When Matteo Ricci (1552-1610), 
the first Jesuit missionary to China, settled in the country in the late 16th and 
early 17th centuries, he was well aware that the term Huihui, although most 
commonly associated with Muslims,11 referred also to Nestorians and Jews 
(Ben-Dor Benite 2015, 504-08). It is only at this point in time that there is solid 
evidence of Sinophone Muslims (Sino-Muslim or Chinese Muslims in the 
linguistic sense) beginning to refer to themselves as Huihui. 
                                                             
9  It is assumed that these Central Asian people might have been related to the contemporary 
Uyghur ethnicity, particularly because of the similarities of the sound of the ethnonyms 
Huihu/Huihe and Uyghur. 
10  Sart is derived from the Sanskrit sarthavaha, meaning merchant or caravan leader. Accord-
ing to a comment by Michael Brose during Pleasure, Providence and Purity: An International 
Conference on Food and Drink in Islamic Societies and Cultures, Hong Kong, April 27–8, 
2017, Huihui was first used as a toponym (see also Dillon 2015, 13). It is very likely that the 
meaning then expanded to include different Central Asians. 
11  In Ricci’s report, he refers to Muslims with the then-European term for Muslims: Saracens 
(see Trigault 1953, 106–7; Ricci 1615, 116–07). 
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3.2 Late Imperial Huihui and Islam 
The following questions arise: How did Sinophone Muslims employ the term 
Huihui in their self-identification? Did they distinguish themselves from Mus-
lims who did not identify as Huihui, and to what extent? There is no single 
answer to these questions. The presupposed civilizational or empire-wide 
groupness associated with Sino-Muslims – where groupness is the basis for 
modern Huihui minzu or ethnicity in general12 – did not take root across the 
whole civilizational-imperial sphere of China. After the fall of the Song dynas-
ty, there was a significant change in Muslim settlements. The fall of the Song 
dynasty meant an end to fanfang settlements and the relatively autonomous 
intra-Muslim legal jurisdiction. Muslims moved from commercial city enclaves 
to dispersed settlements across China. In Yuan China, the application of sha-
riʻa law among Muslims was pushed towards a relatively private realm with 
the establishment of the Bureau of the Qadis across the Yuan Empire to deal 
with matters related to marriage, property, and inheritance (Erie 2016, 48-9). 
With the dissolution of the Mongol racial class system13 following the fall of 
the Yuan dynasty, Muslim immigrants entering China during the Yuan period 
had to undergo a long process of adapting to the local conditions in their vari-
ous regional settlements throughout the Ming Empire. This was reinforced by a 
state-sanctioned program of sinicization (cf. cultural integration) starting from 
the early Ming dynasty, which included de jure prohibition of endogamy be-
tween Muslims (or Huihui in the exact wording of the legal code) and obligat-
ing intermarriage between Muslims and Han Chinese (Daming lu jijie fuli juan 
zhi liu 大明律集解附例卷之六 2017). However, these imperial policies were 
not evenly enforced throughout the empire. Instead, given China’s vast territo-
ry, local or regional societies played a decisive role. If we consider the Mus-
lims residing in the northwestern part of Ming China, their economy could not 
be separated from that of their Central Asian (Turkic/Persian) co-religionists. 
Conducting the tea and horse trade in this frontier area, many of those whom 
the Chinese sources called Huihui were bilingual, partly because of their Cen-
tral Asian ancestry. Even when the Ming court enforced harsh regulations on 
the local Muslim merchants to impose a state monopoly on trade, frontier Hui-
hui under the domain of the Ming never stopped interacting with Muslims of 
the Western Regions (Xiyu 西域), i.e., Turfan and beyond. When there were 
                                                             
12  For modern Huihui minzu, it would be a national 'groupness' instead of a civilization-
al/imperial one. For an analysis and critique of “groupness”/“groupism,” see Brubaker (2009; 
2012, 28). 
13  Yuan-dynasty society was divided into four classes along ethnic lines in the following order: 
Mongols, Semu 色目, Hanren 漢人, and Nanren 南人. Semu was a miscellaneous category 
including peoples from Western and Central Asia. Hanren referred to Northern Chinese who 
were ruled by the Jin dynasty (1115–1234) prior to the Mongol conquest. Nanren literally 
meant Southerners, who were Chinese ruled by the Southern Song dynasty. 
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agrarian distresses and harsh restrictions on commerce in the late Ming and 
early Qing periods before the incorporation of Xinjiang, Turfan Muslims even 
joined these frontier Huihui in rebelling against the governmental forces (Ros-
sabi 1979). The eastward spread of Naqshbandyah Sufism among existing 
Muslim communities from western Turkistan all the way into the frontier re-
gion of China14 during this period might be another factor linking these Muslim 
communities (Lipman 1998, 54; see Fletcher 1974, 20-1). The general structur-
al arrangement of communities in this frontier region both within and outside 
the domain of imperial China was one that centered on the local mosque or Sufi 
order and engaged in similar commercial activities with people speaking at 
least one common language. As such, it is hard to conceive of a ‘Sino-Muslim’ 
structural identity in this area that was entirely distinct from that of the neigh-
boring Central Asian Muslims. Islamic practices were a constitutive, if not 
defining, element in the structural identity of these frontier Huihui in the late 
Ming to early Qing periods. They were under continuous Islamic civilizational 
influence from Central Asia and were geographically distant from the power 
center of Chinese civilization, even though they fell within the administrative 
domain of the Chinese empire. 
The situation on the southeastern coast of China was the converse. In Chen-
dai, Fujian there was – and is – a lineage tracing Huihui as their forefathers. 
Originating from Dashi Muslim merchants living in the fanfang in Quanzhou, 
Fujian,15 this lineage retained Islam – which formed part of their ancestors’ 
structural identity – only as part of their textual ancestral narrative within ten-
generation time. According to the Dings’ Genealogy, which goes back to the 
Ming dynasty, the Ding lineage depicted themselves as descendants of the 
Huihui Sharif Sayid Ajal Shams al-Din ‘Umar al-Bukhari (1211-1279),16 who 
practiced the jiao (teaching) of Huihui (Wang 2017a, 36-50), i.e., Islam. In the 
memoir Zujiao shuo 祖教說 (“On the teachings of the ancestors”), attributed to 
the tenth-generation patriarch Ding Yanxia 丁衍夏 (b. 1518), it is recalled that 
the lineage did not use coffins to bury the dead, never ate pork, used to face 
west to worship ‘Heaven’ together, observed a month of fasting every year, and 
always washed themselves before interacting with the ‘God.’ However, by the 
time the memoir was written, people seldom worshiped Heaven, consumed 
pork occasionally, found Buddhist monks or Daoist priests to perform death 
rituals, burned paper money for the dead, etc. (Zhuang 1996, 29). Throughout 
the whole Genealogy, there are hardly any further references to the doctrinal 
content of the Islamic faith. Ding Yanxia mentions that the lineage would recite 
the “pure” scripture (qingjing 清經) in a foreign voice at festivals and funerals 
                                                             
14  That is the present-day provinces of Ningxia, Shaanxi, Gansu, and Qinghai. 
15  This was one of the biggest port cities along the ancient maritime Silk Road in the Southern 
Song dynasty. 
16  Sayyid was a prominent governor of southwestern China, appointed by the Yuan court. 
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without understanding the content. This “pure” scripture is very likely to be the 
Quran. Thus, without sustained Islamic practices and reasonable Islamic 
knowledge, the Dings’ identity would hardly be marked by the structural or 
institutional distinctiveness of Islam. Islam eventually became a vague textual 
or oral memory. What took the place of Islam was the cultural invention of ‘the 
lineage’ (zongzu 宗族) that swept across south China (Faure 1989).17 Due to 
the agricultural economy in the region, it was necessary to concentrate village 
resources. In this context, the problem of group boundary maintenance took 
precedence with ‘the lineage’ as a response to resource distribution and genera-
tion.18 Through the composition of a textual genealogy, and the emphasis on 
ancestral veneration through proper ritual performance, there arose a new 
communal identity structured around the lineage that built upon Confucian 
values, especially the attributive ideal of xiao 孝 or filial piety (at least) for the 
local literati and gentries of the lineage who composed Dings’ Genealogy.19 
Thus, the communal boundary of ‘the lineage’ demarcated the Dings from 
other village lineages, rather than there being an ‘ethnic’ demarcation from the 
Han or other ‘ethnically’ different Muslims, or a ‘religious’ one from other 
‘religious’ groups. 
The above examples illustrate the spectrum of identities spanning from a liv-
ing tradition to a distant memory. The two groups above were located in re-
gions relatively distant from the political power centers of late imperial China. 
As such, their identity constructions were more dependent on the regional 
societies. However, the most solid evidence of practicing Muslims incorporat-
ing Huihui as their identity sign can be found in the imperial centers. Here, 
Muslims did not just signify themselves by employing the term Huihui as a 
transliteration of a foreign toponym or ethnonym. Instead, they reinvented the 
concept behind the signifier by drawing on symbols from both the neo-
Confucian tradition and the Islamic tradition. The former was the state ortho-
doxy of governance and the agreed cosmology of the Chinese literati officials 
in the late imperial period; the latter was the institution that defined the com-
munities of Muslim enclaves in cities. 
The earliest surviving written record of Muslims referring to themselves as 
Huihui is a stone inscription, Chi ci libaisi ji bei 敕賜禮拜寺記碑 (“Tablet on 
the Imperial Bestowed Mosque”), crafted in 1613 at the Beijing Niujie Mosque 
                                                             
17  See also Wang (2017b) for the lineage construction of Huihui in Guangxi. 
18  The 20th century ethnicization of the Dings as Huihui minzu cannot be separated from the 
social, economic, and political incentives given by the People’s Republic of China’s minority 
minzu (ethnic) policies (Gladney 1996, 261–91; Wang 2017c). 
19  Dru C. Gladney argues that the Dings’ Huihui identity is shaped around the “truthfulness” 
(zhen 真) of their lineage (1996, 261–91). This might have been the case in the 1980s when 
the Dings had to demonstrate to the state that they were part of the Huihui minzu. Howev-
er, Confucian values, especially filial piety, were emphasized in the late imperial period, and 
the maintenance of the lineage’s 'truthfulness' would itself be an expression of filial piety. 
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(Yu and Lei 2001, 3-5). On this stone tablet, Huihui is written as two distinct 
Chinese characters which share the sound hui. The first one is 回 (hui), which 
appears throughout our discussion on Muslims in China. The other is 輝 (hui), 
which means radiant or to illuminate. The word 回 (hui) has a more common 
usage in Chinese, classical or modern alike, meaning: return, reflect, com-
ing/going back, or echo, etc. By drawing upon these meanings, the stone in-
scription uses 回 (hui) to spell out the basic existential condition of human life 
from an Islamic perspective: death. Claiming to reference a similar ‘ancient’ 
Confucian usage of hui as death, the tablet describes death as a return to the 
sole Lord, Allah, who is the source of life. Those who have returned to Heaven 
after death, because they followed the command of the Heaven(ly Lord) and 
the deeds of the Sage20 in their lifetime, are also classified as 回輝 (hui hui), 
i.e., returners to the light. Therefore, it is clear that the community equated their 
communal sign Huihui with believers (mu’min) or submitters (muslim). The 
idea of hui 回 is also understood in the context of communal worship. By 
drawing on the parallelism of the Hajj – the “return” (hui 回) to the Ka‘ba – 
and the communal worship performed in the Niujie Mosque in the Ming capital 
of Beijing, the structural identity of this Muslim community was simultaneous-
ly constructed as believers of Islam and pious subjects of the Ming Empire. 
Communal worship was portrayed as an act that had the personal approval of 
the empire’s sovereign, who was the Son of Heaven. Moreover, communal 
worship was not just an act endorsed by the political powers which took place 
within an authorized space. Muslim worship was a positive response to the 
religio-political power, with prayers for blessings upon the country and the 
prevention of disasters. This penetration of political power within the mosque 
institution, and thus the shaping of the structural identity of this Huihui com-
munity, cannot be separated from the fact that they were residing in the imperi-
al political center. Thus, by reinterpreting the meaning of their identity sign 
Huihui, Chinese Muslims simultaneously addressed the problems of maintain-
ing the group boundary of their city enclave and integrating into the empire 
through submission to the sovereign’s power. 
3.3 The Han kitab Construction of Huihui 
The blunt political allegiance engraved on the stone tablet, however, did not 
fully demonstrate the depth and breadth of the influences the ‘master pattern’21 
                                                             
20  Chinese Muslims understood the Prophet Muhammad in the Confucian terms of sagehood 
(see Frankel 2011, 80–92). “Heavenly Mandate” (tianming 天命) and the “deeds of the Sage” 
(shengxing 聖行) on the tablet likely refer to the Qur’an and the Sunna respectively in Con-
fucian terms. 
21  Ben-Dor Benite (2005, 24–5) borrows the concept of a “master pattern” from Pierre Bour-
dieu to denote the Chinese Muslims’ scholarly tradition as an “individual pattern” that 
emerged out of the larger Chinese scholarly culture, i.e., the “master pattern”. 
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of Chinese civilization had on the Muslim episteme. Political allegiance could 
not be the sole element of a purely (or functionally demarcated) political identi-
ty as pious subjects of the empire, as there was not a political sphere autono-
mous from Confucian cosmological references; such cosmological interpreta-
tions were inseparable from the elaborate literati tradition. It was through this 
tradition that some Muslims found the means and discursive resources to con-
struct the Huihui identity as being simultaneously Islamic and Chinese (Ben-
Dor Benite 2005, 12-9), not just as religious members and political subjects on 
an institutional level, but addressing the attributive level of what marks Huihui 
as special in relation to the ultimate. This was facilitated by the mutual influ-
ence of Sufi texts and the neo-Confucianism of Cheng Yi 程頤 (1033–1107) 
and Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200). There was a network of Muslims learned 
enough to be called Huiru 回儒, or Muslim scholars/literati, with extensive 
knowledge of the Chinese literati tradition, including the ‘three teachings’ – 
Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism (Murata 2017, 34n3).22 These scholars 
acquired their Islamic training through “scriptural hall education” (jingtang 
jiaoyu 經堂教育), the mosque-based education that was common in late impe-
rial big cities. Scriptural hall education was modeled after traditional Confucian 
education to provide Chinese-language Islamic educations for young Sino-
phone Muslims starting from the mid-Ming (Lipman 1998, 45-51). Their cur-
riculum included translated Sufi works like Mirsad al-‘ibad min al-mabda ila 
‘l-maʻad داѧѧѧѧعملا ىѧѧѧѧلإ آدѧѧѧѧبملا نѧѧѧѧم داѧѧѧѧبعلا داѧѧѧѧصرم (The Path of God’s Bondsmen from 
Origin to Return; Razi 1982) by Al-Razi (d. 1256) (Frankel 2011, 36-9). The 
Huiru produced a corpus of works referred to as the Han kitab. Among those 
who produced the Han kitab texts is an epitomic figure, Wang Daiyu 王岱輿 
(c. 1590-c. 1658), who devoted a chapter to the meaning of Huihui in two of 
his books, Zhengjiao zhenquan 正教真詮 (Real Commentary of the Orthodoxy) 
and Xizhen zhengda 希真正答 (Orthodox Answer to the Very Real) (Wang 
1999, 197-201, 487-9). According to Wang, the essential meaning of Huihui is 
realized only when one understands the deepest meaning of “Returning Return-
er.”23 Adding more nuances to the understanding of ‘return’ than death, which 
we found on the Chi ci libaisi ji bei inscription, Wang understands ‘return’ in 
terms of the doctrine of the “Origin and Return” (al-mabda’ wa-l-maʻad  
داѧѧѧѧѧعملاو آدѧѧѧѧѧبملا), which relates to the idea of the “Unity of Being” (wahdat al-
wujud دوѧѧجولا ةدѧѧحو). On the surface, ‘return’ is understood as death and resurrec-
tion. In this way, Wang warns people to properly conduct and cultivate their 
lives within the ‘orthodoxy’ – consisting of both the teachings of Islam and 
Confucianism (and the Buddhist and Daoist teachings that are endorsed by 
Confucianism) – so that one may physically return to where one came from 
                                                             
22  Or even the Teaching from the West, i.e., Catholicism and the knowledge brought by the 
Catholic missionaries, in the case of Liu Zhi (Frankel 2011, 163-75). 
23  Murata (2017, 139) translates Wang Daiyu’s chapter title “Huihui” as “Returning Returners.” 
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before creation. This, in turn, refers to the Creator. Thus, ‘return’ implies the 
‘origin.’ 
A deeper sense of ‘return’ is portrayed as several epistemological levels in-
cluding the realization of an origin, the search for it, and union with the one 
and only Origin. Wang equates the realization of the existence of and the 
search for an origin – by transcending worldly desires and the phenomenologi-
cal truth – with reaching Buddhist Thusness (Skt. tathata; Ch. zhenru 真如), 
Confucian “Supreme Polarity” (taiji 太極)24 or the Daoist “Gateway of the 
Manifold Secrets” (zhongmiao zhi men 眾妙之門).25 It should be noted that 
Confucian ‘Supreme Polarity’ implies a potential for polarizing into yin and 
yang (Adler 2015), and the subsequent creation of the phenomenological 
world. According to Wang Daiyu, in order to unite with the Origin, which is 
the stage of the “Non-Polar” (wuji 無極),26 one must go beyond the three teach-
ings and abandon one’s subjectivity by attaining the “no-heart” (wuxin 無心).27 
According to Wang, when one reaches this stage of “Non-Polar,” one com-
munes with the Origin; and one will even recognize (ren 認) the Origin as the 
“True Lord” (zhenzhu 真主), Allah. This is the ultimate level of Hui (Wang 
1999, 199). Wang’s description of a gradation of the levels of truth in relation 
to the meaning of the ‘return’ likely corresponds to the Four Doors hierarchy of 
spiritual progress in Sufi theoretical writings, namely shari‘a, tariqa, haqiqa, 
and ma‘rifa. Conducting one’s life according to the ‘orthodoxy’ of the three 
teachings and transcending the phenomenological world through the three 
teachings corresponds to abiding by the Divine law (shari‘a) and the spiritual 
techniques of a particular order or school (tariqa) respectively. The stage of 
‘Non-Polar’ is highly analogous to a general understanding of haqiqa as com-
munion with the undivided Truth. Whether Wang maintains a distinction be-
tween the stage of ‘Non-Polar’ and the ultimate Hui of the recognition of God, 
and thus suggests the ultimate level of spiritual knowledge of God (ma‘rifa), is 
a matter of interpretation. Regardless, Wang identifies Islam as the single path 
to these later stages. His reason for elaborating on the meaning of Huihui seems 
to be to demonstrate to Muslims, especially those who are out of touch with 
their tradition, that the basics of being Huihui are fully compatible with the 
Chinese ‘orthodoxy’ on the orthopraxy of life. However, being fully Huihui 
means spiritual superiority that goes beyond the orthodoxy of Chinese literati. 
To put it another way, Huihuis’ Islamic tradition grants them the potential to 
master supreme spiritual knowledge, so only those who have attained or set out 
to attain such knowledge are living up to the name of Huihui. Therefore, Wang 
identifies the Huihui as being Muslim in the attributive and not merely struc-
                                                             
24  Reasons for translating taiji as “Supreme Polarity,” see Adler (2015). 
25  Using D.C. Lau (2001) translation of the term zhongmiao zhi men. 
26  Reasons for translating wuji as “Non-Polar,” see Adler (2015). 
27  The 'no-heart' is probably inspired by Buddhist language (Murata 2017, 24). 
HSR 44 (2019) 3  │  241 
tural sense. The spiritual or mystical truth permitted by the tradition of Islam 
marks Muslims as special. In this way, Huihui is an attributive identity of these 
anomalous (epistemic) relations with the ideal – the Origin/God. 
However, this attributive identity of Huihui did not exclude people of other 
descent or traditions, at least in theory. Some sources claim that Wang engaged 
in extensive debates and exchanges with scholars of other traditions, i.e., Con-
fucians, Buddhists, and Daoists; the Xizhen zhengda records many of these 
dialogues. An anecdote states that Wang even took an abbot from a Buddhist 
monastery as his disciple in 1650 (Murata 2000, 21). Thus, knowledge about 
Huihui and about the essence of Huihui was open to anyone who wanted to 
seek the truth in the cosmopolitan scholarly culture of late imperial China. 
Those within the high literati culture were not necessarily confined within a 
single tradition despite the presence of explicit conceptual demarcations of 
various traditions – as the word jiao implies. In late imperial China, distinctions 
were made between varying “system[s] of beliefs and practices”, or what 
Wilfred Cantwell Smith would define as “religions” (1991).28 However, from 
the example of Wang Daiyu, it is obvious that the search for transcendental 
knowledge crossed boundaries between different traditions. Wang’s under-
standing of Huihui was so influential that an important Han kitab scholar from 
the metropolitan area of Jinling (present-day Nanjing), Liu Sanjie 劉三杰 (fl. 
the end of 17th century; Leslie 1981, 88) appropriated many of his wordings 
when explaining the meaning of Huihui. 
In his “On the Pure and True Teaching” (Qingzhen jiaoshuo 清真教說), Liu 
Sanjie, however, spelt out the meaning of Huihui explicitly as an alternative 
name for the Pure and True Teaching (qingzhen jiao 清真教), a name em-
ployed by Chinese Muslims to refer to their religious tradition (Liu 1984).29 
The use of the suffix jiao and the content of Qingzhen jiaoshuo indicates an 
effort to systematize the understanding of Islam in a single piece of work, ra-
ther than addressing scattered concepts related to Islam like in Wang’s works. 
The deliberate use of the suffix jiao suggests an attempt in this Jinling Huiru 
intellectual lineage to more explicitly abstract the whole system of teaching 
from the individual. In this sense, and in the works of other Huiru like Ma Zhu 
馬注 (1640-c.1710), a concept of a reified Islam did exist before post-imperial 
China. The Huihui identity was not just strengthened by its association with a 
reified Islam; another historical contingency – ethnic origin making – came 
                                                             
28  I thank Katerina Dalacoura for drawing my attention to the theoretical dimensions of the 
reification of religion and Islam in particular. 
29  Qingzhen jiao is the name for Islam in Chinese that has been used by Muslims since the 
17th century or earlier. This usage was probably an appropriation of earlier translations of 
names of other Abrahamic religions, such as Judaism, by their adherents in China. There was 
perhaps an even earlier usage of the term qingzhen in Buddhist or Daoist contexts (Frankel 
2011, 170, 222n56). This name denotes the purity and the truthfulness of one’s tradition, 
Islam in our case. 
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into play. In the post-imperial period, these two developments were further 
systematized through secular discourses. 
One generation later, the diasporic memory of the foreign origin of Muslims 
was exploited in a new methodological construction of the Huihui identity. Liu 
Sanjie’s son, Liu Zhi 劉智 (c. 1660-c. 1739), spending most of his life under 
the reign of the Qing Kangxi Emperor (r. 1661-1722), was very much influ-
enced by his time. In this period, a new scholarly methodology of philology 
became prevalent among Chinese literati in the kaozheng 考證 or “evidential 
studies” movement (Elman 2001). Employing this new kaozheng method, Liu 
Zhi added a new dimension to his discourse on Huihui in his passage “On 
Huihui” (Huihui shuo 回回說) (Liu 2000). In addition to understanding Huihui 
as signifying an attributive religiosity, a concept inherited from Wang Daiyu 
via the academic lineage of Liu’s own father, Liu traces the philology of the 
notion Huihui as a creative transmutation from the Chinese misrepresentation 
of his in-group as Huihe. According to Liu, the people of the Pure and True 
Teaching were followers of Muhammad’s teaching and were called mumin 穆
民 or mushi 穆士30 in their native land of Tianfang 天方, or the Heavenly 
Square (which is the Kaʻba and by extension Mecca and Arabia). Because 
these Muslims shared the same teaching with the people of Huihe, a ‘country’ 
between China and Arabia, the Chinese in the old days jumbled their name and 
referred to these Muslims as Huihe as well. Only later did Muslim scholars 
arriving in Song and Yuan China rename themselves Huihui, the meaning of 
which is specified in Liu Sanjie’s work and other Confucian philologi-
cal/philosophical works. 
This historicized nominal myth establishes an imaginary ancestry for Chi-
nese Muslims tracing back to the ‘original’ community at their religious sanc-
tuary – Tianfang. In this period, numerous ethno-religious communities 
throughout the diverse Qing Empire undertook ‘orthodox’ descent construction 
projects in an effort to legitimize their existence. This trend was very likely 
unintentionally inspired by a similar project undertaken by the ruling minority, 
the Manchus (Frankel 2016, 37). This project was at one of its heights during 
the reign of the Kangxi Emperor who sought to establish himself as a hegemon 
among the Hans, Tibetans, and the Mongols by drawing on differing elements 
from their respective traditions. Liu Zhi’s Huihui shuo was one of a number of 
Chinese Muslims’ scholarly attempts at creating a common descent for Hui-
hui.31 However, it differs from earlier texts in two ways. Firstly, it contains less 
                                                             
30  Mumin may be a direct transliteration of “believer” – muʾmin نمؤم in Arabic. Mushi could 
be an abridged transliteration of Muslim, taking the first syllable of Muslim, or a contrac-
tion of mumin and xinshi 信士 – believer. 
31  The other genre of literature in descent-making is the colloquial novel, which is exemplified 
in the Huihui yuanlai 回回原來 (Origin of the Huihui) (see Ma 1998, 53–72). The earliest 
existing version of the text attributes its authorship to Liu Sanjie. 
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of the neo-Confucian speculative philosophical language that was heavily 
employed in the earlier texts of the same scholarly lineage. The positivist turn 
in Liu’s Huihui shuo indicates a drift away from the use of normative (reli-
gious) language in the construction of Huihui identity. Still, this did not result 
in a modern ethnicity of Huihui in 18th century China. As Huihui shuo con-
cludes by recalling the worthiness of Huihui in the eyes of Chinese emperors of 
different dynasties, it can be inferred that one of the major purposes of the text 
was to legitimize the existence of Chinese Muslims in the empire by employing 
the literati discourses and methodologies of that time. The legitimacy of Mus-
lim constituencies in the Qing Empire within the Han cultural sphere32 still 
relied heavily on them abiding by the orthodox ritual-politics, which continu-
ously dominated the official literati discourse on governance of the empire (van 
der Veer 2016, 118-22). One only has to recall the famous Chinese Rites Con-
troversy, in which Kangxi Emperor expelled Catholic missionaries who fol-
lowed the Pope’s ruling that Chinese ancestral worship was ‘idolatry’ to under-
stand the ritual-politics Huihui faced by the time that Liu Zhi wrote his Huihui 
shuo. By employing the language of scholarship and maintaining the orthodox 
Jinling Han kitab understanding of the identity sign Huihui, in line with both 
the Islamic and neo-Confucian traditions, Liu prevented the Huihui identity 
from being seen as unacceptable from the imperial perspective. Secondly, in 
Huihui shuo, there seems to be an explicit effort to create a common descent of 
Huihui that is distinct from the linguistically different Huihe by historicizing 
the role of Huihui in China, while still drawing on elements from the same 
institutional tradition shared with the Huihe, Islam.33 It is hard to tell whether 
Liu Zhi distinguishes Chinese Muslims from his contemporary Central Asian 
Muslims, and Uyghurs in particular, as the transliteration of the Uyghurs start-
ing from the Ming dynasty had occasionally taken the form of Weiwuer 畏兀兒
/畏吾兒 instead of Huihe. As Liu had never travelled beyond Eastern and Cen-
tral China (Frankel 2011, 5-10), it was very likely that he distinguished the 
Huihui from the ‘imaginary’ Huihe (cf. the actual Central Asian Muslims at the 
                                                             
32  There was a pluralistic mode of governance within different “cultural spheres” (bu 部) in the 
Qing Empire in which the discourses on legitimacy to rule and be ruled varied. For example, 
from Kangxi Emperor to his grandson Qianlong Emperor (r. 1735–1796), the imperial court 
had a project to promote “martial value” (wu 武) in order to "forge a more closely aligned 
set of cultural preferences among the diverse peoples they ruled–Manchus, Mongols, Tibet-
ans, and Uighurs as well as Chinese. Rather than seeking to draw their Inner Asian subjects 
into the orbit of Chinese civilization, the Qing rulers sought to promote values associated 
with the cultures of Inner Asia among their Chinese subjects, in a process that was just the 
reverse of the sinicization routinely claimed as inevitable. The purpose was to bring together 
diverse traditions within a single polity, in other words to unite and rule their multiethnic 
and multicultural empire" (Waley-Cohen 2003, 326). 
33  Instead, the actual historical situation was similar to that of the late Ming where the Huihui 
residing on the northwestern frontier identified more with their Central Asian co-
religionists, which might have blurred the distinction further. 
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time) mentioned in Chinese historical texts. The linguistically different Huihe 
in the Huihui shuo were therefore a creation of Liu’s “evidential studies.” One 
should not conclude from this single text that there was an empire-wide distinc-
tion between the Huihui and their Central Asian co-religionists. 
It is evident that the Han kitab construction of the Huihui identity drew 
heavily on the ‘religious’ elements – both attributive and structural – of the 
Islamic tradition and underlined its compatibility with the ‘master pattern’ of 
the Chinese empire. This demonstrates concern about the dual problem of 
maintaining the religio-cultural group boundary while also integrating into the 
empire. The response to these two problems converges in the “guiding idea” 
(see Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt 2012; 2017) – of orthodoxy. The orthodoxy 
of the Islamic tradition understood by the Huiru is interpreted in the framework 
of the imperial orthodox cosmology. This language of orthodoxy represents an 
alternative to that of secularity in response to the same reference problem. 
Although there were emerging trends of referencing a reified Islam and histori-
cizing Huihui existence in China as demonstrated in Liu’s writing,34 they can-
not be seen as a transition to a secular identity configuration. Essentially, these 
two trends were not aimed at ‘disembedding’ the person from the system of 
Islam and attributing agency to the Huihui in their history-making (history-
making is seen by many as an integral part of defining secular human agency; 
see Asad 2003, 67-99). Instead, the Han kitab’s efforts to systematize the Pure 
and True teaching – as seen in the Qingzhen jiaoshuo – were deliberate efforts 
to excavate and illustrate an ‘authentic’ form of Islam. With their historiciza-
tion of the Huihui, the Han kitab scholars trace this ‘authentic’ form of Islam 
all the way back to the first transmitter of the final and pure Dao (道 “the 
Way”)35: Prophet Muhammad. The intention was the purposeful construction 
(via scholarly exploration) of the Daotong (道統 Transmission of the Dao) of 
Islam among the Huihui with the Huiru as the embodier of this Daotong.36 The 
Huiru’s identification with Daotong and orthodoxy – using the language of the 
Chinese imperial state, which is a “religious state” (Lagerwey 2010) analogous 
to the “church” in Christendom – confirms the possibility that “the [reference] 
problems in question are not ‘resolved’ in the direction of secularity but 
through the imposition of religious authority” (Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt 
2012, 889; 2017, 22). 
In the following, it is suggested that the increasingly positivist logic behind 
the shift in both scholarly methodologies and ethnic-origin discourses was 
constitutive in constructing a modern ethnic identity for Huihui in post-imperial 
China. In addition, the tension between Chinese history and Islam in the de-
                                                             
34  The Huihui yuanlai has similar historicizing features as well (see footnote 32). 
35  One of the attributive ultimate concepts in Chinese cosmology in denoting the cosmic 
principle. 
36  Cf. the idea of the ulama as heirs to the Prophets. 
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scent creation of Huihui was very much alive throughout the Republican peri-
od. However, the modern formulation of Huihui as an identity among the ge-
neric categories for ethnicity and religion depended largely on the political 
context and authorized discourses. 
4. Towards the Post-Imperial Controversy of Hui 
4.1 Introduction of Minzu Discourse and Concerns about 
Exclusion from the Chinese Nation 
The modern history of secularity of Islam in China – its reification as a religion 
– cannot be separated from the negotiations regarding the ethnization of the 
Huihui following the Chinese nation-building process starting in the late Qing 
and continuing into the first half of the 20th century. This historical develop-
ment was filled with tensions between the demand for group rights and the 
need for societal/national unity, alongside the novel need to respond to modern 
guiding ideas, such as rationality, that correspond to the larger functional dif-
ferentiation. The new development of the Huihui identity in this period was 
reflected in two newly imported (families of) concepts, “religion” and “ethnici-
ty/race/nation” or zongjiao 宗教 and zhongzu 種族/minzu 民族 respectively in 
Chinese. The possible way of conceptualizing religious traditions was funda-
mentally altered when Japanese linguists in the mid-19th century coined the 
term shukyo 宗教 (Ch. zongjiao; Josephson 2012), combining the traditional 
Chinese characters 宗 (zong) and 教 (jiao)37 to capture the modern Western 
concept of religion. This neologism was then exported to China for its modern 
usage – as “a distinct religious system in contrast to secular life and differenti-
ated from other religious systems” – in the late 1800s (Yang 2008, 11).38 The 
Chinese use phrases with the word zu 族39 to communicate and translate con-
cepts related to ethnicity, race, and nation. Like jiao in zongjiao, zu had a simi-
lar fate as a “return graphic loan” – i.e., a sign coined overseas using the same 
(classical Chinese) signifier, but where that signifier’s place of origin has rea-
dopted the foreign-coined sign – from Japanese (Liu 1995, 33), causing a huge 
discursive change to the word. In the late 19th century, the Japanese used 
minzoku 民族 (Ch. minzu) to translate the idea of nation from modern Europe. 
                                                             
37  The original meaning of zong 宗 is lineage or ancestry, whereas jiao 教 means to teach, a 
teaching, or the teaching depending on the context.  
38  In classical Chinese, zongjiao was first used in the Buddhist context referring to the specific 
teachings of a sect or a school of thought. See Chen (2002, 45–54). 
39  In classical Chinese, zu originally meant kinship group, and gradually extended to a larger 
communal meaning. Belonging to a kinship group does not guarantee any natural claim to 
political power, such as the self-determination required for nation-building. 
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Modeling their nation-building path on that of the Germans, the Japanese un-
derstood minzu as a similar concept to das Volk in German – as a collective of 
people biologically related (race or ethnic group or zhongzu 種族 in Chinese) 
based on a common language, history, and cultural attributes (Wang 2015, 54-
8; Lipman 1998, xx; Dikötter 1992, 61-125). However, the role of religion for 
these people varies in different minzu discourses. In the following section, the 
notion of ethnicity and race are taken as similar categories (Brubaker 2009), 
corresponding to the ambiguity of the Chinese vocabularies. Regardless, I 
consider nation to be a concept that denotes a group identity with a ‘natural’ 
claim to political power such as the self-determination required for nation-
building. 
This Japanese ethnic-national idea of minzu was highly appealing to mem-
bers of the Revolutionary Alliance (Tongmeng hui 同盟會) in Japan during the 
first decade of the 1900s. Led by Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925), the late-Qing revo-
lutionists aspired to establish a Chinese nation state based on a single minzu 
model, in which the minzu was first and foremost Han. However, this idea 
caused doubts and worries among those who supported the revolutionary cause 
but who did not fit naturally into the available identity discourse provided by 
their Han revolutionist counterparts. Among those who criticized Sun’s revolu-
tionary discourse were Chinese Muslim students residing in Japan. Modeling 
themselves on the Revolutionary Alliance, 36 Muslim students (including one 
female student and one imam) established the Muslim Educational Association 
of Students in Tokyo (Liudong qingzhen jiaoyu hui 留東清真教育會) in 1907. 
The aim of the association was to mobilize the Muslims in China culturally and 
politically through reforming Muslim education by expanding its curriculum to 
include modern science, patriotism, and political instruction. The most notable 
effort of the association was their publication, the first modern Chinese Muslim 
periodical – Muslim Awakening (Xinghui pian 醒回篇) in 1908 (Matsumoto 
2003, 270-4). This single-issue magazine provides valuable insight into the 
association’s understanding of Huihui identity through their interpretation of 
zongjiao and minzu. Through this, it is possible to see the early attempts by 
modern Chinese Muslims to formulate a group identity that had an either 
zongjiao or minzu configuration, whether deliberately or not, in response to the 
political situation that they were in. Faced with the Han revolutionists’ popular 
racial/ethnic political premise that a great nation was a nation comprising a 
single minzu, in this case the Han minzu, two antitheses to prevent exclusion 
stood out among other plausible reformulations: 1) rejecting the single minzu 
formulation and claiming that a multi-minzu nation could be modernized and 
strengthened; 2) following the single minzu formulation and reformulating 
one’s identity to fit into that single minzu. These two plausible antitheses to 
Han nationalism can be seen in Muslim Awakening (Yu, Lei, and Li 1992). 
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Surprisingly, Bao Tingliang 保廷梁 (1874-1947), who was both a member 
of the Revolutionary Alliance and a Muslim, turned to the first solution.40 In his 
article “Urging My Fellow Men to Assume Responsibility in Fostering Educa-
tion” (Quan tongren fuxing jiaoyu zhi zeren shuo 勸同人復興教育之責任說), 
Bao argues that religion is able to alter one’s racial consciousness such that 
those who originally belonged to different races can perceive themselves as 
belonging to the same race41 (ibid., 53). Although he assigned Hui/Muslim to a 
racial (zhongzu) category, for Bao, zhongzu was a convenient label for a collec-
tive of people. Islam was key to constituting the Hui identity. By equating 
Huis’ supposed religious (zongjiao) identity with zhongzu identity, and stating 
that any zhongzu was a constituent element of the Chinese nation, every Mus-
lim national could participate in the Chinese nation-strengthening process.  
The reformulation of the Hui identity in order to fit into the single minzu 
paradigm can be found in the writing of Huang Zhenpan 黄镇磐 (1873-1942), 
the association’s secretary. In his article “On the Hui people” (Lun huimin 論回
民), he stresses that “Hui is not the name of a race (zu) but a religion (jiao)” 
(ibid., 58). Huang traces the name Hui back to the Huihe people and repeats 
parts of the original myths that were circulating during the Han kitab period. 
However, in addition to recounting the foreign origin and the biological propa-
gation of Muslims in China, he argues that there were many local Chinese 
converts to Islam over the millennia. These all contributed to the assimilation 
of Muslims in China, as Huang states: “After more than a thousand years they 
multiplied and, as demonstrated by Hong Jun, were melted in this big oven and 
have become of the same kind (tongzhong 同種) [as other inhabitants of China] 
– therefore how can they be called a different race (zu)?” (ibid., 58).42 Thus, 
biologically speaking Hui are the same as other Chinese. He even further con-
fines the Hui identity as a religious one by employing the old Chinese Muslim 
notion: “struggle for religious issues but not for state [power] (zhengjiao bu 
zhengguo 爭教不爭國),” which implies the functional differentiation between 
politics and religion.  
These two formulations led to two distinct directions of formulating the Hui 
identity in relation to the modern notion of religion: the first – reformulating 
Huihui as a minzu that was shaped by a religious factor – made Huihui more 
than a religious identity and enabled them to operate in (non-religious) social 
spheres related to the building of the Chinese nation. The second formula re-
stricted Huihui to being a religious identity – Muslim – operating within the 
functionally demarcated religious sphere. In this second formulation, the Hui 
are supposed to engage in the political sphere as Han or Chinese nationals. 
                                                             
40  Biography of Bao, see Wang (2015, 131 n.3) and Xu and Ha (2011, 66–73, 109). 
41  The biological connotation of race was implicit in the notion of minzu/zhongzu in the 
popular discourses of that period. 
42  The translation is found in Cieciura (2016, 113). 
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4.2 Reification of Islam through Education and Modern 
Organization 
The link between these two seemingly diverging ways of formulating the Hui 
identity was the reification of Islam, or Huijiao 回教. This new reified under-
standing of Islam, or religion in general, is evident in the other articles in Mus-
lim Awakening. It differs from the late imperial understanding of Islam as a jiao 
– a set of embodied practices embedded in the politically authorized cosmolo-
gy, where this understanding was produced by corresponding institutions, e.g., 
the ‘scriptural hall education’ and the imperial bureaucracy. The collapse of 
this late imperial episteme, especially that of the traditional imperial polity and 
the traditional education in the Late Qing Reform (1901-1911) with the ration-
alist “religion vs. superstition” discourse and respective “destroy temples and 
build schools” campaign (Goossaert 2006; 2008, 209-12; see also Nedostup 
2009), formed the historical context for these young authors’ understanding of 
Islam. For them, Islam was a set of systematic principles and practices, best 
exemplified by the Five Pillars of Islam (Zhao 1992), which could be isolated 
from the corresponding institution. Therefore, it was possible for them to advo-
cate an “internal conversion”43 of Islam into its modern institutional forms, 
including the establishment of a national institution for the monitoring of the 
development of Islam, the adoption of modern media (printing press, newspa-
pers, magazines, etc.), and the founding of standardized institutions for the 
preservation and transmission of religious knowledge (Yu, Lei, and Li 1992, 
44-50). This went alongside advocating reforms of Huihui education to confine 
religious education to the transmission of the Five Pillars in order to assure 
Muslims a place in paradise, and make room for civic national education. This 
was aimed at transforming Muslims into “Chinese nationals” capable of con-
tributing to the survival of the modernizing Chinese nation (Zhao 1992).  
To be religious, therefore, no longer meant having an identity that was sub-
sumed in the structural engagement and attributive embodiment of that reli-
gion. Rather, Muslims in the modern context became associated with a relative-
ly voluntary involvement with the reified religious institution/sphere. The 
language of secularity above penetrated the modern Chinese Muslim reformist 
ideas that supported the mushrooming of modern Muslim educational institu-
tions and Islamic associations throughout the Republican period (Aubin 2006). 
The creation of these associations was “intimately linked to nationalist ideas, 
and both concurred in the invention of a Muslim citizen” (Goossaert and Palm-
er 2011, 88). 
                                                             
43  See Geertz (1993, 170–89) on “internal conversion.” 
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4.3  Political Negotiation between Religious and Ethnic Identity 
In 1912, with the establishment of the Republic of China, the Muslim Awaken-
ing authors’ concern about the Hui being excluded from China was eliminated 
de jure. Building on the 1911 Revolution framework, the new republic recog-
nized the wuzu 五族, or the “five ethnicities/nationalities.”44 The wuzu concept 
was derived from the idea of the peoples who inhabited the five different “cul-
tural spheres,” or bu 部, of the territory that the republic inherited from the 
Qing Empire. These “five cultural spheres” were Manchuria, China proper, 
Mongolia, Tibet, and the “Hui land” (Huibu 回部). In turn, these corresponded 
to the five zu: Manchu, Han, Mongol, Tibetan and Hui (Cieciura 2016, 114-5; 
see also He 2006). Logically, the Hui would have meant those people who 
inhabited Huibu – Xinjiang – of the former Empire, who were mainly Turkic 
Muslims. However, as demonstrated earlier, Chinese Muslims in China proper 
had been included under this name as well. This ambiguity had played a role in 
the “wuzu gonghe (五族共和 unity/republic of the five zu)” slogan gaining 
support from many Chinese Muslims throughout the country during the 1911 
Revolution. Very likely for the sake of a larger basis of legitimacy from Mus-
lims across the country, the revolutionists did not specify Huizu 回族 as people 
from a specific region, such as Xinjiang. This ambiguity is reflected in the 
Provisional Constitution of the new Republic in its reference to the ethnic 
concept of a Huizu with no specific reference to the Hui Land. It is also worth 
noting that under this Chinese (multi-ethnic) national framework in the Provi-
sional Constitution, freedom of belief was ensured (Shangwu Yinshuju 1916). 
With this constitutional setting, parliamentary political participation was to be 
proportionally shared among ethnic groups, whereas political participation for 
religious groups was limited and their political representation within the state 
apparatus was largely restricted.45 Thus, the issue shifted from whether the Hui 
should be incorporated into the nation state, as argued in Muslim Awakening, to 
whether they constituted a legitimate entity for political participation. Since the 
status of zu signified such an entity in the new republic, the debate shifted 
towards whether the Huihui were eligible for such status. 
4.4  Religious Hui and Ethnic Hui as Different Groups 
In the early period of the Beiyang government era (1912-1928), the govern-
ment was not too concerned with rationalizing or making theoretically coherent 
                                                             
44  It is likely that the wuzu national framework was part of a strategy by the forefathers of 
the Republic to inherit the whole territory of the Qing Empire. Until 1921, Sun Yat-sen still 
favored a Han nation in which the wuzu were all acculturated to Hanzu (Sun 1970, 889). 
45  This might not be the case for Christianity, as many of the new political elites of the repub-
lic received education from Christian missionary schools and universities. Many converted to 
Christianity, or at least expressed sympathy/admiration for Christianity. 
HSR 44 (2019) 3  │  250 
the discourses on religion and ethnicity by instituting a (theoretical) distinction 
between the two concepts, at least with regard to Muslims. With the dual nature 
of Hui – signifying both ethnic Turks (Uyghurs, Karzakh, etc.) and religious 
Chinese Muslims – some, who were called Hui due to their religious identity, 
engaged, deliberately or unintentionally, in nation-state (ethnic) politics as well 
as retaining power in the religious sphere, through the discursive fluidity of 
Hui-ness. For example, a Chinese Muslim named Li Qian 李謙, who was ap-
pointed by the Khan of Kumul as the Full Representative of the Eight Khanates 
of Huibu (Xinjiang) to the capital of the republic, managed to use his identity 
as a religious Hui to gain support for his political agenda from both Muslims of 
the inner provinces and people in Xinjiang, only the latter of whom his official 
position was supposed to represent (Fang 2010; Hua and Zhai 2012). This 
tendency was evident in the discourse of the state-endorsed Association for 
Common Progress of the Five Zu (Wuzu Guomin Hejinhui 五族國民合進會). 
According to the minutes of the general assembly of the association, the five zu 
were just generic categories of convenience; important members of zu like the 
Kazak in northwestern China and Miao in southwestern China were all wel-
come to join the association at any time (Huang 2006). In these state-endorsed 
minzu discourses, the effects of geography, religion, and political difference 
were all equalized and minimized before the mythical history of the Great 
Chinese Nation – the descendants of the original inhabitants of the plain along 
the Yellow River. It was said that these descendants migrated in different direc-
tions at different historical moments and eventually developed into separate 
lineages of people throughout Eurasia (Wuzu Guomin Hejinhui 五族國民合進
會 1914).  
This paramount weighting of national unity did face two criticisms: first, 
concerning the group rights of the Hui people; second, concerning the concep-
tual conflation of religious and ethnic identity from the perspective of modern 
rationality. These eventually combined into discourses calling for a distinction 
to be made between the religious Hui (Chinese Muslims) of the inner provinces 
and the ethnic Hui (Turks) in Xinjiang province, assigning the right to religious 
freedom and legitimate political representation to these distinctive groups re-
spectively (Shou 1912a; 1912b; Gonghe guomin 1912; Yin 1985; Cieciura 
2016, 115-26). However, with the emergence of East Turkistan nationalism, the 
republic’s central government’s diminished political control over East Turki-
stan (Wang 2013, 25-46); and with the adoption of a Western ethnic (presuma-
bly ‘scientific’) understanding – referring to the Huizu as Tujue 突厥 (Chinese 
transliteration for Turks) or Weiwuer 維吾爾 (Uyghur) – in Xinjiang (Wang 
Riwei 1937), the discourse identifying Hui as ethnic Turks in Xinjiang became 
less relevant. Instead, the question shifted back to the problem of identifying 
Chinese Muslims within the inner provinces as religious adherents or an ethnic 
group. 
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4.5  Hui: Han Believers of Islam 
After the Nationalist Party’s Northern Expedition (1926-1928), which resulted 
in the domination of Chiang Kai-shek’s faction, Chiang’s government officially 
adopted a hardline assimilationist vision of the Chinese nation as an ethnically 
homogeneous whole dominated by Han culture, which regarded its Hui citizens 
as Han believers of Islam. There were cases where civil organizations with 
names that included Huimin 回民 or “Hui people” had to be renamed as “Hui-
jiao” associations on the administrative orders of Chiang’s government (Wan 
2015). The underlying formulation of this Hui identity can be conceptualized as 
a form of “hyphenated Chinese” (Lipman 1996): The ‘religious range’ of the 
Hui identity – that of being Muslim – was subordinate to the ‘political range’ of 
being a Chinese national. The forcing of this language of functional differentia-
tion to confine the expression of Hui to being religious did not prevent Chinese 
Muslims from engaging in the political realm with their religious identity. 
Nationalist/patriotic imams and religious students, who were under the influ-
ence of anti-imperialist Islamic discourses from the Middle East, reinforced 
their national Chinese identity with religious justification. Strongly influenced 
by their time at Al-Azhar University in Egypt, these imams and religious stu-
dents moved away from the late imperial Han kitab political theory that the 
source of power and legitimacy of a political entity comes from a personal 
sovereign who embodies the Mandate of Heaven – and that God is the source 
of the Mandate of Heaven due to the Unity of Being. The prominent Imam 
Wang Jingzhai 王靜齋 (1879-1949), who went to Al-Azhar in his forties 
(Wang 1937), published articles in the widely-read Chinese Muslim magazine 
Yuehua 月華 spreading the (purported) hadith: “Hub al-watan min al-iman  
(ناѧمملإا نѧم نطوѧلا بѧح)”46 – “the love of one’s homeland [springs forth] from the 
faith.” Based on what he had learned at Al-Azhar, he interpreted al-watan as 
‘the place where you live.’ Given that his audiences were largely Chinese Mus-
lims, the homeland for them would be China. Many pious Hui accepted that 
they should defend and build their homeland, the Chinese nation (Wang 1930; 
Matsumoto 2006).  
Although many of these Nationalist imams and religious students were 
brought up under the Qadim (ميدق Old) jiaopai 教派 or “teaching school” of 
Islam,47 which drew upon the Han kitab and other indigenous traditions from 
                                                             
46  This hadith is not found in the most reliable sources but appears in Kashf al-Khafa’ wa-
Muzil al-Ilbas (1102), al-Silsilah al-Hadith ad-Da’ifah (36), and is reported by Al-Saghani in 
his al-Mawdhu’at (81). 
47  Jiaopai is the indigenous way of addressing Islamic groups in China, instead of using, for 
example, “sect” or “school of jurisprudence,” because virtually all Chinese Islamic teaching 
schools are Sunni and Hanafi (except for Salafiya). The major jiaopais in China, apart from 
the Qadim, include the modernist Yihewanli, Xidaotang, which focuses on the study of the 
Han kitab and Sufi orders such as Jahriya, Khufiya, Qadiriya, and Kubrawiya. 
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the imperial era, they added to, or perhaps went beyond, the above ontological 
understanding of political legitimacy based on the Unity of Being by searching 
for direct scriptural justification for nationalism. This was reflected, on the one 
hand, by the popularity of the above-mentioned hadith. On the other hand, they 
showed a deep deference towards the Islamic materials from the Middle East as 
a large number of modern Arabic Quranic commentaries, works by authors like 
Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905) and Muhib al-Din al-Khatib (1886-1969) 
(Matsumoto 2006), were translated into Chinese and published in dozens of 
Chinese Muslim magazines. Nonetheless, the transfer of knowledge was highly 
selective. Only those materials that were in line with Chinese nationalism and 
of benefit in the face of imperialist aggression and indigenous modernism were 
adopted by students at Al-Azhar (Mao 2016). This is an interesting case where, 
when responding to the problem of national integrity, references were made by 
drawing on the communication or discourses produced within a supposedly 
functionally differentiated religious sphere to foster a supposedly secular Chi-
nese national identity. This process of religious justification of national identity 
is in turn accompanied by a nationalization of the religio-cultural group identity 
configuration. 
4.6  Hui Nation Beyond the Chinese Polity: Pan-Islamism 
The structural elements of Islam can be used to inspire the creation of a politi-
cal unity beyond the existing nation state. However, this political unity does not 
necessarily follow a religious logic but rather a secular (national) one. As its 
geopolitical ambition expanded after the successive victories in the 1895 First 
Sino-Japanese War and the 1905 Russo-Japanese War, Japan plotted psycho-
logical warfare to mobilize the people of Huijiao (“Hui religion”, jap. Kaikyō)48 
from the Far East to the Middle East (Office of Strategic Services 1943; Wang 
2015, 193-229). These efforts continued until the end of World War II. By the 
1920s in China, propaganda efforts such as the founding of the magazine 
Huiguang 回光 (Light of Islam) within the Society of Light (International 
Moslem Association) in Shanghai by a Japanese man named Teijirō Sakuma 佐
久間貞次郎 (1886-1979) were common. In an article entitled “Political Situa-
tion of China and Muslims” (Huijiaotu 回教徒49) (1925), Sakuma called on 
Muslims in China to strive for independence. His reasoning was that Hui was a 
zu (“race” or “nationality”) with state recognition. Thus, the Hui should be able 
to claim political rights and resort to political actions when necessary. Accord-
ing to Sakuma, Huizu (“Hui nationality”) was built on a religious basis, where 
the religion – Islam – was seen as political by nature. This political feature of 
                                                             
48  The Chinese name Huijiao 回教 was also used in Japanese for Islam before and during the 
early 20th century. 
49  That is, followers of the teaching of the Hui, which is Islam. 
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Islam further allowed the self-determination of Huizu independent of the Chi-
nese nation. This independent nationhood of Huizu was consistent with the 
Pan-Islamism that Japan had been advocating, as a means to create “a buffer 
‘Muslim autonomous state’ in North-west China or in Central Asia” (Bodde 
1946b, 330). Pan-Islamic understanding of the Hui was also formulated within 
China in response to the growing slander and prejudice against Chinese Mus-
lims (Nedostup 2009, 17; Bodde 1946a, 282). A young Muslim, Xue Wenbo 薛
文波 (1909-1984), drew his readers’ attention to understanding Huizu as the 
Pan-Islamic nation by emphasizing the oppression Muslims faced within and 
outside China. This allowed him to construct a unified consciousness of the 
Pan-Islamic nation. It is not hard for one to observe the Leninist rhetoric in his 
writing as he wrote that  
the countries of the Muslim nations (Huijiao minzu guojia 回教民族國家) 
were the first objects of oppression and exploitation by Euro-American pow-
ers. Therefore, those ruled and oppressed in the world are Huizu, the proletari-
ans [of the world] are Huizu, and now the Huizu are already awakened, and 
most of them want to unite under the banner of Islam (Huijiao). (Ciecuria 
2016, 129; Xue 1933b)  
Xue’s later writings took a more systematic turn, unlike his ‘Han believers’ 
theory opponents, he pointed out that minzu are not simply based on shared 
blood but culture, customs, psyche, and religion (Xue 1933a). 
4.7 Huihui minzu: ‘Cultural’ Identity Between Religious Individual 
and Independent Nation 
The increasingly theoretical/systematic language employed by Xue developed 
from a broader evolution in modern Chinese scholarly language with an analyt-
ical power that resembles its Western counterpart. This development of the 
language enabled a more sophisticated configuration of the Hui rather than 
either reducing it to the religious individuals or inflating it to a nation per se. 
There was still another way to construct the Hui as an identity marked by Is-
lamic characteristics, but within the Chinese national boundary, which was 
made possible by the adoption of Western (Japanese) terminologies/neologisms 
and modern historiography. The terminology of wenhua 文化, or culture, was 
important. Imam Wang Jingzhai coined the term “Huijiao wenhua 回教文化,” 
or (Chinese) Islamic culture, in an essay published in 1939 (Wang 1985). 
His basic premises about this “Hui culture” were as follows: there is a distinc-
tive “(Chinese) Islamic culture” or “Hui culture,” which was implicitly differ-
ent from Islam itself (even though it was ‘inseparable’ from it). This culture 
was in turn “inseparable” from the “Hui people” who created it. Finally, and 
most significantly, this culture was “Chinese,” since it had sprung forth from 
China. As the home of the Muslims, China, therefore, did not simply “house” 
them, but was also the birthplace of their culture (wenhua). (Ben-Dor Benite 
2004, 98) 
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This concept of culture allowed a theoretical separation of the material mani-
festations or the practical dimension of Islam from any references to the at-
tributive elements of tradition, i.e., references to the ‘special’ (see earlier sec-
tions of this article on ‘attributive differentiation’). In addition, Wang 
acknowledged that Huijiao wenhua was not just any culture but one that was 
developed in China. ‘Huijiao culture’ here becomes an intermediary meso-level 
abstraction for communal connections between the universally encompassing 
religious cosmology and “buffered self” in Taylor’s assertion (2007, 300). The 
role of ‘Hui culture’ is particularly important for Hui group identities to con-
nect with the secular nation state, which is similar to the construction of ‘Islam-
ic civilization’ suggested by Katerina Dalacoura (2019, in this special issue). 
The difference is that ‘Islamic civilization’ in her case was created to link the 
reforming Ottoman Empire or the Turkish Republic with the ‘universal com-
munity’ of Islam by preserving its Islamic heritage; whereas the indigenousness 
of ‘Hui culture’ in China relates and legitimizes the inclusion of Chinese Mus-
lims in the modern Chinese nation state. However, both ‘Hui culture’ and ‘Is-
lamic civilization’ are rendered as products of human endeavor in a temporal 
demystified history and thus as secular constructs. The point about indigenous-
ness is picked up by the historian Jin Jitang 金吉堂 (1908-1978), who, in his 
Zhongguo huijiao shi yanjiu 中國回教史研究 (Studies in the History of Chi-
nese Islam; Jin 1935; 1971), argues that Huijiao minzu 回教民族 (“Hui-
religion nationality”) or Huimin/zu (“Hui people/nationality”) is a Sinophone 
Muslim ethnicity. To deal with the difference between Huizu and Muslims in 
Xinjiang, Jin acknowledges that Huizu has a more heterogenic makeup of peo-
ple from different Muslim regions. What is unique about these people is that 
the minzu history began on Chinese soil when these people started to mix and 
reproduce. Due to this diverse makeup of individuals and the unique starting 
point on Chinese soil, the Huizu, Jin argues, are Chinese and have their own 
language (i.e., Chinese) and “custom” (fengsu 風俗/xiguan 習慣), which is 
synonymous with Wang’s ‘culture.’ Thus, Jin provides a rather nationalized 
narrative about Huizu. In another publication, Jin states that this cultural 
uniqueness is the result of the special social-political dimension of Islam which 
binds people together with social teachings and shari’a law (Jin 1937; 1974).  
Jin’s was the first scholarly Chinese Muslim attempt to argue for a separate 
Sinophone Muslim ethnicity. His argument became popular among the Hui 
elites in the later years of the Republic. Communist theorists used his argument 
to justify their early treatment of the Hui as an ethnic minority or ‘minority 
nationality’ in Soviet terminology. After the Long March (1934-1935), the 
Communist forces settled in northwestern China, where Muslims had a signifi-
cant presence. In their attempts to gain support from these frontier people while 
constrained by Stalinist theories, Chinese Communist Party specialists decided 
to identify Chinese Muslims as a historically oppressed minzu rather than a 
religious group. This granted the Hui(hui min)zu 回(回民)族 minzu status and 
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later promised them benefits, which was in stark contrast to Chiang Kai-shek’s 
banning of the term Huizu in the 1940s (Ciecuria 2016, 139). This laid the 
general framework for the contemporary People’s Republic of China under-
standing of the Huizu as a people with historical links to Islam who emerged 
within China, thus, making them a secularizable ethnicity with rights within the 
Great Chinese Nation (“Huizu jianshi” bianxie zu 1978; “Huizu jianshi” 
xiuding ben bainxie zu 2009). 
5. Concluding Remarks: Huihui Group Identity Formation 
and Differentiation Theory 
In the above historical account on the development of the identification of 
Chinese Muslims as Huihui, I have employed Stausberg’s framework to identi-
fy the co-existence of different types of differentiation. This framework allows 
us to recognize different elements of the Hui identity discourses as ‘religious,’ 
or as related to a ‘religion,’ in a specific way. However, it does not allow for 
further scrutinizing the relationship between the development of religio-cultural 
group identity and societal differentiation. An additional theoretical perspective 
is needed to deal with certain questions, especially those related to the specific 
use of a particular form or combination of differentiated elements beyond a 
single tradition. For instance, why did the Hui of the Ding lineage switch to the 
use of the attributive element of filial piety (xiao) instead of, say, submission 
(islam). I suggest interpreting this as a response to the ‘reference problems’ of 
other social systems. This goes beyond Stausberg’s remit of the “evolution of 
religion” (2010, 361). In this case, I consider Luhmann’s theory of differentia-
tion to be helpful in understanding the dynamics between differentiation, refer-
ence problem, and group identity creation. Luhmann distinguishes between (1) 
segmentary differentiation, which creates similar or equal societal subsystems, 
distinguished on the basis of either descent or residential communities; (2) 
differentiation in terms of center and periphery; (3) stratification, which pro-
duces dissimilarity in rank; and, finally, (4) functional differentiation (Luh-
mann 1977, 32-6; 2013, 12-3). 
In the Huihui case: the Huihui as Semu class in the Yuan Dynasty refers to a 
form of stratification; the Ding lineage is a segmentary subsystem in the re-
gional society; the Han kitab understanding of Huihui is based on a center-
periphery differentiation, where the true ‘returner’ is heading towards the 
(theological/cosmological and political) center; finally, the creation of the 
Huihui minzu follows the segmentary differentiation, although it is structurally 
coupled with functionally differentiated systems. As these varying forms of 
differentiation produce societal (sub)systems by their own logic, the reference 
problems and corresponding solutions are related to that. My main argument 
with regard to the divergent late imperial and post-imperial responses to the 
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emerging reference problems in the direction of religion or secularity respec-
tively can be viewed in this light. Thus, the guiding idea of orthodoxy as an 
expression of the center becomes prominent in the Han kitab formulation; 
conversely, the employment of the ‘secular’ formation of Hui identity is needed 
to render it an equal segment of the modern Chinese nation.  
For an evolution of differentiation to take place, we will usually find a “la-
tent preparation and the emergence of new orders within the old” (Luhmann 
2013, 12). This aligns with my observation of the reification of the Pure and 
True Teaching and the historicization of Huihui in the late imperial period as 
constitutive to the post-imperial development. We should not forget that differ-
entiations co-exist and regulate the deployment of each other. This may allow 
us to have a more precise understanding of the “ambivalence” (Dressler 2015) 
observed in minority discourses in various post-imperial nation states. For the 
case of Huihui in early post-imperial China, it seems adequate to speak of the 
domination of the segmentary differentiation path (nation/ethnic formation), 
influenced by a discourse on functional differentiation, at least from the per-
spective of the Hui people. As a result, the constant engagement in theorizing 
the Hui ethnicity – e.g., by formulating concepts like ‘culture’ originating from 
functional systems – should be read as an effort to differentiate a nationwide 
Hui unit on an equal footing with other minzu. 
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